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In 2008 the Canadian government passed amendments to the Environmental Protection 
Act requiring five percent ethanol in transportation fuels sold in Canada by 2010 and 
two percent renewable content in diesel and heating fuels by 2012.  This has important 
implications for the quantities demanded and supplied of biofuels both within and 
beyond the Canadian market.  While federal policies in Canada have been designed to 
impose a minimum five percent of Canada’s transport gasoline by 2010, some interest 
groups have called on federal and provincial governments to increase the mandated 
content beyond that level.  The objective of this study is to compare the relative 
economic impacts in Canada of achieving a ten percent biofuel content either through 
increased imports or by substituting domestic production in place of increased imports. 
 
A customized version of the deterministic Food and Agricultural Policy Research 
Institute (FAPRI) modeling system was used to assess the impacts of two alternative 
scenarios: 1) an increase in Canadian ethanol demand to ten percent of domestic liquid 
fuel consumption by 2011 that is met through increased domestic supply only and 
requires trade barriers, and 2) the same increase met through increased imports where 
there are minimal or no barriers to trade.  In the first scenario, ethanol imports are held 
at the baseline levels and all additional ethanol demand is satisfied from domestic 
ethanol sources at a higher “made-in-Canada” price.  To maintain the higher price for 
ethanol some form of trade barrier, tax exemption, subsidy program or domestic use 
requirement would be necessary.  While any or all of these trade barriers would be open 
to challenge under the North American Free Trade Agreement or at the WTO, 
identifying and quantifying their economic impacts is important given the political 
pressure to insure demand is met locally.     
 
Estimates of Canadian ethanol production, consumption, imports and price for 2011 for 
the three situations (5% baseline, 10% with trade barriers and 10% with no trade 
barriers) are shown in Table 1.  In the baseline projection for 2011 (where five percent 
of the gasoline supply is made up of ethanol), ethanol consumption in Canada was 
estimated to be 2.198 billion litres.  That would be supplied by 1.343 billion litres of 
domestic production and 855 million litres of imports.  The estimated production is 
almost equal to the 1.338 billion litres of production capacity available in Canada as of 
April 2009.   
 
A ten percent mandate for ethanol content would lead to an estimated consumption of 
3.996 billion litres of ethanol in 2011 if trade barriers prevented additional ethanol 
imports (Table 1).  This would come from domestic production of 3.141 billion litres of 
ethanol and imports of 855 million litres, the same level as in the baseline.  If additional 
trade barriers were not imposed, Canadian consumption of ethanol would rise to 4.211 
billion litres.  With no increase in production from the base case (five percent mandate), 
all of the increase in consumption (2.868 billion litres) would be supplied by imports 
(Table 2).  In the ten percent case with trade barriers, the price of ethanol is estimated 
to rise to C$ 1.13 per litre from C$ 0.62 per litre (Table 1), resulting in lower overall 




In the case where effective trade barriers prevent the importation of additional supplies 
of ethanol, the increased consumption must be satisfied entirely by domestic 
production.  Compared with the base, ethanol consumption would increase by an 
average of 1.016 billion litres per year over the ten year period (from 2.306 billion litres 
to 3.322 billion litres) – a 44 percent increase.  Domestic production would increase, on 
average, by 69 percent.  Canadian ethanol price would increase an average of 48 
percent over the period but would range as much as 90 percent higher in 2011 when 
the difference between the ten percent mandate and the baseline is the greatest.  Since 
ethanol imports would remain unchanged in this case, there would be no response in 
the world ethanol price. 
 
In the case where no additional trade barriers are imposed, annual ethanol consumption 
(over the ten year period) is estimated to increase by 1.119 billion litres per year (48 
percent over the baseline).  The higher consumption of ethanol in this case is a result of 
the imports, which keeps the Canadian ethanol price nearly unchanged from the 
baseline.   Because of the higher mandated consumption, domestic ethanol prices are 
expected to increase slightly (by about $C 0.01/litre) and world ethanol prices would 
increase by six percent (not shown in the table). In response to the six percent increase 
in world ethanol prices, domestic production of ethanol would increase marginally by an 
average of seven million litres per year (over the baseline).  To meet the expected 
average quantity of ethanol demanded in Canada of 3.425 billion litres, average annual 
imports of ethanol would increase 132 percent from 0.840 billion to 1.952 billion litres.  
The model projects that ethanol producers in Brazil would be the most important source 
of increased foreign supplies in Canada.  Figure 1 shows the impacts of the increased 
import demand on the world ethanol price as estimated by the model.  The increased 
demand for ethanol over 2007-2016 in Canada would lead to a US$0.09 – US$0.18 per 
U.S. gallon increase in world prices in the short term relative to the baseline scenario.  
The difference falls to about US$ 0.05 per U.S. gallon by the end of 2016. 
 
The results reveal that import barriers favour domestic suppliers of ethanol at the 
expense of consumers.  Import barriers injure Canadian consumers by limiting their 
access to supplies offered for sale at lower prices by more efficient producers, 
particularly those that are located in subtropical regions.  With freer trade, the domestic 
ethanol price would fall while the world price would rise due to the higher demand for 
ethanol in Canada. Given their comparative advantage in producing, the model 
suggests that Brazilian ethanol suppliers would respond to the higher world price by 
increasing output and exports.  
 
The results also show that import restrictions directly undermine the effectiveness and 
increase the costliness of a higher consumption mandate in Canada.  The relatively less 
expensive ethanol is for the final consumer, the more likely they will use it as fuel over 
available alternatives.  The implication is that restricting imports of ethanol is 
counterproductive to the policy objective of increasing domestic ethanol consumption. 
The results of the study also underscores that eliminating import barriers would be 
costly for ethanol producers in Canada.  In response to the lower prices they would 
receive, the quantities of ethanol they would offer for sale would decrease.     
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Table 1:  Impacts of an Increase in Canadian Ethanol Demand, With and Without 
Trade Barriers, in 2011 (Million Litres) 
 
Ethanol share 














































Figure 1:  Impacts of an Increase in Canadian Ethanol Demand, With Increased 
Trade, on the World Ethanol Price (Scenario 1) 
   




















Baseline With Increased Trade 
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Table 2: Summary Results: Estimated Canadian Ethanol Prices, Production, 
Consumption and Net Imports, 2006-2016 
 
Year  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Avg. 
 
Ethanol  Price 
 
(C$/litre) 
  Baseline (5%)  0.59  0.72  0.72  0.72  0.70 0.66 0.62 0.59 0.56 0.54 0.51 0.63 
  Trade Barriers 
(10%)   0.59 0.62 0.79 0.92 1.08 1.25 1.12 1.04 0.96 0.85 0.74 0.88 
  No Trade Barriers 




(millions of litres) 
    Baseline  (5%)  337  313  584  851 1087 1343 1599 1857 2115 2349 2566 1466 
  Trade Barriers 
(10%)   337  339 1011 1665 2373 3141 3202 3245 3283 3289 3270 2482 
  No Trade Barriers 




(millions of litres) 
    Baseline  (5%)  380  783 1183 1599 1923 2198 2479 2768 3064 3373 3692 2306 
  Trade Barriers  
(10%)  380  810 1610 2414 3209 3996 4082 4156 4232 4313 4396 3322 
  No Trade Barriers 




(millions of litres) 
    Baseline  (5%)  43 471 599 748 836 855 880 911 949  1025  1126 840 
  Trade Barriers 
(10%)  43 471 599 748 836 855 880 911 949  1025  1126 840 
  No Trade Barriers 
(10%)  43  498 1049 1625 2248 2868 2655 2447 2239 2025 1865 1952 
 
 